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Abstract
We consider certain mixtures, Γ, of classes of stochastic games and provide
sufficient conditions for these mixtures to possess the orderfield property.
For 2-player zero-sum and non-zero sum stochastic games, we prove that if
we mix a set of states S1 where the transitions are controlled by one player
with a set of states S2 constituting a sub-game having the orderfield property
(where S1 ∩S2 = ∅), the resulting mixture Γ with states S = S1 ∪S2 has the
orderfield property if there are no transitions from S2 to S1. This is true for
discounted as well as undiscounted games. This condition on the transitions
is sufficient when S1 is perfect information or SC (Switching Control) or
ARAT (Additive Reward Additive Transition). In the zero-sum case, S1
can be a mixture of SC and ARAT as well. On the other hand,when S1 is
SER-SIT (Separable Reward - State Independent Transition), we provide a
counter example to show that this condition is not sufficient for the mixture
Γ to possess the orderfield property. In addition to the condition that there
are no transitions from S2 to S1, if the sum of all transition probabilities
from S1 to S2 is independent of the actions of the players, then Γ has the
orderfield property even when S1 is SER-SIT.When S1 and S2 are both SER-
SIT, their mixture Γ has the orderfield property even if we allow transitions
from S2 to S1. We also extend these results to some multi-player games
namely, mixtures with one player control Polystochastic games. In all the
above cases, we can inductively mix many such games and continue to retain
the orderfield property.
AMS (2000) subject classification. Primary 91A15, 12J15.
Keywords and phrases. β-Discounted/ Undiscounted Stochastic Game, Or-
derfield Property, Mixture Class, Polystochastic Game, SER-SIT (Separa-
ble Reward - State Independent Transition) Game, SC (Switching Control)
Game, ARAT (Additive Reward Additive Transition) Game.
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1 Introduction
Shapley (1953), in his seminal paper, introduced zero-sum discounted
finite stochastic games as a generalization of matrix games. A zero-sum
discounted finite stochastic game consists of a finite number of states, finite
sets of actions for the players, a payoff matrix in each state and transition
probabilities from each state to every other state, for every pair of actions of
the players. As in the case of matrix games, one of the players chooses rows
and the other player chooses columns. We shall assume that the row chooser
is the maximizer and the column chooser is the minimizer. Given a starting
state, the players simultaneously choose actions resulting in an immediate
payoff (the corresponding entry in the payoff matrix) that is paid to the row
chooser by the column chooser and the game moves to a new state depending
on the transition probabilities. Now the players choose actions in the new
state resulting in a payoff in that state and so on. At each time period, these
payoffs are successively discounted by a factor β ∈ [0, 1) and these discounted
payoffs are accumulated over the infinite horizon. Starting at different states,
we obtain different accumulated discounted payoffs. The aim of the row
chooser is to maximize these accumulated discounted payoffs and the aim
of the column chooser is to minimize the same. Strategies of players are
probability distributions over their action sets, at each time period. Shapley
(1953) showed that every zero-sum discounted finite stochastic game has
an optimal value and optimal stationary strategies, that is, strategies that
depend only on the current state and not on how the state was reached.
The concept of undiscounted (or limiting average) payoffs in stochastic
games was introduced by Gillette (1957). Undiscounted payoffs are lim sup
or lim inf of accumulated average payoffs over the infinite run. Mertens
and Neyman (1981) showed that every undiscounted stochastic game has
a value, though optimal strategies may not exist. “The Big Match” with
undiscounted payoffs (Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968) is an example of an
undiscounted stochastic game where one of the players does not have an
optimal strategy, even when behavioral strategies (strategies that depend on
the history) are allowed.
On the one hand, significant research has been done in proving such
existence results. Such results have also been extended to non-zero-sum
stochastic games (Fink, 1964, Takahashi, 1964, Sobel, 1971) and also to
stochastic games with infinite state space and infinite action space (Maitra
and Parthasarathy, 1970). Maitra and Sudderth (1996) proposed an alter-
native proof of the existence of value in the finite, undiscounted, zero-sum
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case which extends to the case when the state space is uncountable as well.
On the other hand, computing the optimal value and optimal strategies (in
the zero-sum case), and a Nash equilibrium (in the non-zero-sum case) has
triggered a flurry of research activity, computational as well as theoretical.
Weyl (1950) showed that matrix games possess the orderfield property.
That is, given payoffs from an ordered field, there exists a pair of optimal
strategies whose coordinates lie in the same ordered field. It follows that
the optimal value lies in the same ordered field as well. Bimatrix games
also have the orderfield property when restricted to the rational field. Nash
(1951) gave an example of a 3-player non-cooperative game with rational
payoffs but a unique irrational equilibrium. Unlike matrix games, stochastic
games may not possess the orderfield property even in the discounted zero-
sum case as pointed out by Shapley (1953). For an explicit example, see
Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1981).
In this paper, whenever we talk of the orderfield property, we restrict
ourselves to the field of rationals.
Definition 1.1. Stochastic Game with the Orderfield Property: A zero-
sum stochastic game with rational inputs (that is, rational payoffs, rational
transition probabilities and a rational discount factor (in case of discounted
stochastic games) is said to possess the orderfield property if it has a pair
of rational optimal strategies (that is, optimal strategies whose coordinates
are rational). It follows that the value of the game is rational too.
A non-zero-sum stochastic game with rational inputs is said to possess
the orderfield property if it has a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies whose
coordinates are rational. It follows that the corresponding equilibrium pay-
offs are rational as well.
Some classes of stochastic games have been shown to satisfy the orderfield
property owing to their special structures. As at least one rational solution is
guaranteed for these games, there is hope for finding a finite arithmetic-step
algorithm to solve them. Examples of finite 2-player stochastic games with
the orderfield property are discounted and undiscounted, zero-sum and non-
zero-sum one player control stochastic games, perfect information stochastic
games, switching control stochastic games, SER-SIT (Separable Reward -
State Independent Transition) games and ARAT (Additive Reward Additive
Transition) games. We discuss these classes in detail in the next section.
Researchers have been successful in designing algorithms for some of these
classes. Refer Filar et al. (1991), Nowak and Raghavan (1993), Raghavan
Orderfield property of mixtures of stochastic games 249
and Syed (2002, 2003), Vrieze (1981) for some of these algorithms. On the
other hand, there are classes where the problem is open. For some classes of
stochastic games, though algorithms for solving them are known, search is
on for efficient algorithms to solve them. For example, there is no efficient
algorithm (yet) to solve switching control stochastic games.
In this paper, we show that the orderfield property extends to mixtures
of these classes with some restrictions on the transition probabilities. By
a mixture, we mean the following. We mix different classes by allowing
transitions among states of different classes. It is known that such mix-
tures may lead to the breakdown of the orderfield property. For example,
Sinha (1989) shows an example where a mixture of two zero-sum SER-SIT
games does not possess the orderfield property. In this mixture, the set of
states S is partitioned to two subsets S1 and S2, such that S1 and S2 are
SER-SIT but the whole game S is not SER-SIT. On the other hand, some
mixtures are known to possess the orderfield property. An example of a
mixture class that has the orderfield property is a mixture of SC (Switching
Control) and ARAT classes (Sinha, 1989). A game belonging to this mix-
ture class has some states satisfying the switching control property and the
remaining states being ARAT. Neogy et al. (2008) provide a constructive
proof and hence an algorithm to solve SC-ARAT mixtures. In this paper,
we propose sufficient conditions for mixture classes to possess the orderfield
property. For example, whenever we mix states from two different classes
C1 and C2, the resulting mixture Γ has the orderfield property if C1 is one
player control, perfect information, switching control or ARAT, states in C2
constitute a sub-game which can be any game with the orderfield property
and there are no transitions from states in C2 to those in C1. On the other
hand, if C1 is SER-SIT, we provide a counter example where the mixture
Γ does not possess the orderfield property. When C1 is SER-SIT, we place
additional restrictions on the transition probabilities to ensure that the re-
sulting mixture has the orderfield property. We highlight the fact that C2
can constitute any game with the orderfield property, not necessarily from
a known class. C2 can be SER-SIT as well. Inductively mixing such classes
leads to a mixture of multiple classes and this mixture has the orderfield
property as well.
Some multi-player stochastic games have been shown to possess the or-
derfield property as well. For example, Mohan, Neogy and Parthasarathy
(1997) show that one player control polystochastic games have the order-
field property in the discounted case. Raghavan and Syed (2002) extend this
result to undiscounted polystochastic games as well. Till date, research on
250 N. Krishnamurthy, T. Parthasarathy and G. Ravindran
mixtures of classes of stochastic games has been restricted to the 2-player
case. In section 5, we look at mixtures of 2-player games with one player
control polystochastic games.
For a detailed discussion on stochastic games, the reader may refer to the
book by Filar and Vrieze (1997), and to the chapter on Stochastic Games by
Mertens (2002) in the Handbook on Game Theory with Economic Applica-
tions, volume 3.
2 Background and preliminaries
2.1 Stochastic games. In this section, we define 2-player zero-sum and
non-zero-sum finite stochastic games with discounted as well as undiscounted
payoffs and we state Shapley’s theorem for discounted zero-sum stochastic
games.
Definition 2.1. 2-Player, Finite Stochastic Game: A 2-player, finite
state space, finite action space stochastic game consists of
1. Two players P1 and P2. We shall sometimes refer to them as players
1 and 2.
2. A finite, non-empty set of states, S = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
3. For each state s ∈ S, finite, non-empty sets A1(s) = {1, 2, . . . ,m1(s)}
and A2(s) = {1, 2, . . . ,m2(s)} of actions for players P1 and P2 respec-
tively. Without loss of generality, we may assume A1(s) = A1 and
A2(s) = A2, ∀s ∈ S.
4. Immediate rewards r1(s, i, j) for player 1 and r2(s, i, j) for player 2,
where s ∈ S, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, when the game is in state s and the
players choose actions i and j respectively. If r2 = −r1 then, we have
a zero-sum game. Otherwise, the game is a non-zero-sum game. We
will use r in place of r1 in case of zero-sum games. We will denote the
matrix of immediate rewards in state s by R1(s) and R2(s) for players
1 and 2 respectively (and by R(s) in case of zero-sum games).
5. Transition probabilities (q(s′|s, i, j) : (s, s′) ∈ S × S, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2)
where q(s′|s, i, j) is the probability of transition from state s to state s′
given that players 1 and 2 choose actions i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 respectively.
These transition probabilities constitute the “law of motion” of the
game. We will use q(s, i, j) to denote the corresponding probability
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distribution. Given, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, we denote the N × N transition
matrix by Q(i, j).
The game proceeds as follows. Given a starting state s0 ∈ S, the players
simultaneously choose actions i0 ∈ A1 and j0 ∈ A2 resulting in payoffs of
r1(s0, i0, j0) and r2(s0, i0, j0) to players 1 and 2 respectively. The game moves
to a new state s1 according to the law of motion q(s0, i0, j0), the players
choose actions i1 ∈ A1 and j1 ∈ A2 resulting in payoffs of r1(s1, i1, j1) and
r2(s1, i1, j1) and so on.
In general, strategies can depend on complete histories of the game un-
til the current stage. Such strategies are called behavioral strategies. We
shall look at the simpler class of strategies called stationary strategies which
depend only on the current state s and not on how s was reached.
For player 1, a stationary strategy f is a function from S to PA1 where
S is the state space and PA1 is the set of probability distributions on player
1’s action set A1. Similarly, we define a stationary strategy g for player 2
as a function from S to PA2 . Alternatively, we can look at f as an N-tuple
of probability distributions from PA1 , one distribution per state. That is,
f ∈ PNA1 where N is the number of states. Similarly g ∈ PNA2 . Pure stationary
strategies are simply a set of actions, one per state.
Definition 2.2. β-Discounted Payoffs: In the non-zero-sum case, given
an initial state s0, a pair of stationary strategies (f, g) of players 1 and 2,
and a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), we define β-discounted payoffs as follows:
[I
(1)
β (f, g)](s0) =
∞∑
t=0
βtr
(1)
t (s0, f, g)) for P1
and
[I
(2)
β (f, g)](s0) =
∞∑
t=0
βtr
(2)
t (s0, f, g)) for P2.
Definition 2.3. Undiscounted payoffs: In the non-zero-sum case, given
an initial state s0, and a pair of stationary strategies (f, g), of players 1 and
2, we define the undiscounted (or limiting average) payoffs as follows:
[Φ(1)(f, g)](s0) = lim inf
T↑∞
[
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
r
(1)
t (s0, f, g)
]
for P1
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and
[Φ(2)(f, g)](s0) = lim inf
T↑∞
[
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
r
(2)
t (s0, f, g)
]
for P2.
In the above definitions, r
(1)
t (s0, f, g) and r
(2)
t (s0, f, g) are the expected
immediate rewards at the t-th stage, to players P1 and P2 respectively.
In the zero-sum β-discounted case,
[I
(1)
β (f, g)](s0) = −[I(2)β (f, g)](s0).
(We shall denote I
(1)
β by Iβ in this case). Similarly, for the zero-sum undis-
counted case,
[Φ(1)(f, g)](s0) = −[Φ(2)(f, g)](s0).
(We shall denote Φ(1) by Φ in this case).
We write Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r1, r2, q, β), (Γ = (S,A1, A2, r1, r2, q)) to de-
note a β-discounted (undiscounted) non-zero-sum stochastic game with set
of states S, sets of actions A1 and A2 and rewards r1 and r2 as per Definition
2.1 above. Whenever r1 = −r2, we have a zero-sum game.
Definition 2.4. Optimal Strategies and Optimal Value: A pair of sta-
tionary strategies (f∗, g∗) is optimal in the zero-sum discounted case, if for
all s ∈ S,
[Iβ(f, g
∗)](s) ≤ [Iβ(f∗, g∗)](s) ≤ [Iβ(f∗, g)](s) ∀f ∈ PNA1 , ∀g ∈ PNA2 ,
(assuming player 1 is the maximizer and player 2 is the minimizer). The
vector Iβ(f
∗, g∗) as a function of the starting state s is unique (Shapley,
1953) and we denote this optimal value vector by vβ.
A pair of stationary strategies (f∗, g∗) is optimal for the undiscounted
zero-sum game, if for all s ∈ S,
[Φ(f, g∗)](s) ≤ [Φ(f∗, g∗)](s) ≤ [Φ(f∗, g)](s) ∀f ∈ PNA1 , g ∈ PNA2 ,
(assuming player 1 is the maximizer and player 2 is the minimizer).
We write v to denote the optimal value vector Φ(f∗, g∗) of the undis-
counted stochastic game which is a function of the initial state s.
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Definition 2.5. Nash equilibrium: A pair of stationary strategies (f∗, g∗)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the discounted case if for all s ∈ S
[I
(1)
β (f
∗, g∗)](s) ≥ [I(1)β (f, g∗)](s) for each f ∈ PNA1
and
[I
(2)
β (f
∗, g∗)](s) ≥ [I(2)β (f∗, g)](s) for each g ∈ PNA2 .
(assuming that both players want to maximize their payoffs).
Similarly, in the undiscounted case, a pair of stationary strategies (f∗, g∗)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium, if for all s ∈ S
[Φ(1)(f∗, g∗)](s) ≥ [Φ(1)(f, g∗)](s) for each f ∈ PNA1
and
[Φ(2)(f∗, g∗)](s) ≥ [Φ(2)(f∗, g)](s) for each g ∈ PNA2 .
(assuming that both players want to maximize their payoffs).
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley, 1953). A 2-player zero-sum discounted stochas-
tic game Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r, q, β) has an optimal value vector vβ which is the
unique solution of the following system of equations
v(s) = val[R(s, v)]
for all s ∈ S, where R(s, v) is the auxiliary matrix game with (i, j)th entry
given by r(s, i, j) + β
∑
s′∈S q(s
′|s, i, j)v(s′) and the minmax value of the
matrix game given by val[R(s, v)].
For each state s ∈ S, if (f∗(s), g∗(s)) is a pair of optimal strategies of
the matrix game R(s, vβ), then (f
∗, g∗) is a pair of optimal strategies for the
discounted stochastic game Γβ, where f
∗ = (f∗(1), f∗(2), . . . , f∗(N)) and
g∗ = (g∗(1), g∗(2), . . . , g∗(N)).
2.2 Orderfield property of stochastic games. We describe some classes
of stochastic games that are known to possess the orderfield property. We
refer the reader to a survey by Raghavan and Filar (1991), a survey by
Mohan, Neogy and Parthasarathy (2001) and a survey by Raghavan (2003)
for more details on these classes and on algorithms for solving some of them.
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Definition 2.6. Stochastic Games with Perfect Information (Shapley,
1953) are stochastic games in which in every state, the action space of (at
least) one of the players is a singleton. In other words, we can partition the
set of states S into S1 and S2 where S1 is the set of player 1 states (where
player 2 has just one action and hence no choice) and S2 is the set of player
2 states (where player 1 has just one action).
Definition 2.7. One Player Control Stochastic Games (Parthasarathy
and Raghavan, 1981) are stochastic games in which only one of the players
controls the transitions. For example, when player 2 controls transitions,
q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|s, j) for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s, s′ ∈ S.
Definition 2.8. Simple Stochastic Games (Condon, 1992) are stochastic
games with reachability objectives and no immediate rewards. There are 2-
special absorbing states, the 0-sink and the 1-sink. Player 1 (the maximizer)
wins if the 1-sink is reached, player 2 wins otherwise. Leaving out these
special sink states, we can partition the remaining states into S1, S2 and S3,
where S1 is the set of player 1 states, (where player 2 has just one action
and hence no choice), S2 is the set of player 2 states (where player 1 has just
one action) and S3 is the set of nature (or average) states where the players
do not have a choice and nature chooses the next state according to some
probability distribution.
Remark 2.1. SSGs form a subclass of Perfect Information Stochastic
Games where the transition probabilities are 0 or 1 for all action-pairs in all
states, S1 and S2 are player 1 and player 2 states respectively and in S3,
both players have just one action.
Definition 2.9. SC (Switching Control) Stochastic Games (Filar, 1981)
are games where the law of motion is controlled by player 1 alone when the
game is played in a certain subset of states and by player 2 alone when the
game is played in other states. In other words, a switching control game is
a stochastic game in which the set of states are partitioned into sets S1 and
S2 where the transition probabilities are given by
q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|s, i), for all s′ ∈ S, s ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2,
q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|s, j), for all s′ ∈ S, s ∈ S2, j ∈ A2, i ∈ A1.
Remark 2.2. Switching Control Stochastic Games are a superclass of
Perfect Information Stochastic Games, One Player Control Stochastic Games
and SSGs.
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Definition 2.10. SER-SIT (Separable Reward-State Independent Tran-
sition) Games (Parthasarathy, Tijs and Vrieze, 1984) are stochastic games
in which
1. the rewards can be written as the sum of a function that depends on
the state alone and another function that depends on the actions alone.
That is, r(s, i, j) = c(s) + a(i, j) for all s ∈ S, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, for the
zero-sum case. For the non-zero sum case, r1(s, i, j) = c(s) + a(i, j)
and r2(s, i, j) = d(s) + b(i, j) for P1 and P2 respectively, for all states
s ∈ S, and actions i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
2. the transitions are independent of the state from which the game tran-
sitions. That is, q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|i, j) for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s, s′ ∈ S.
Definition 2.11. ARAT (Additive Reward Additive Transition) Games
(Raghavan, Tijs and Vrieze, 1986) are stochastic games where
1. the reward function can be written as the sum of two functions, one
depending on player 1 and the other on player 2. For the zero-sum
case, r(s, i, j) = r′(s, i) + r′′(s, j), for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s ∈ S. We can
similarly write down r1 and r2 in the case of non-zero-sum games.
2. the transition probabilities can be written as a sum of two functions,
one depending on player 1 and the other on player 2. That is, for all
i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s, s′ ∈ S,
q(s′|s, i, j) = q1(s′|s, i) + q2(s′|s, j).
Different algorithms have been proposed for solving many of these classes
of stochastic games. Some of these algorithms reduce these stochastic games
to a Linear Program, some of them reduce them to matrix or bimatrix games,
some of them use policy-improvement techniques similar to those for Markov
Decision Processes (MDP) and others use Linear Complementarity Problems
(LCP) and Vertical LCPs (Refer Cottle, Pang and Stone, 1992). For related
results on the orderfield property of stochastic games and algorithms for
various classes, apart from the citations listed above, we refer the reader to
Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze (2007), Mohan et al. (1999), Schultz (1992),
Sobel (1981), Syed (1999), Thuijsman and Raghavan (1997), Vrieze et al.
(1983).
There are interesting examples of stochastic games that have the order-
field property and that do not belong to any of the above classes. The Big
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Match (Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968) with undiscounted payoffs does not
have the orderfield property. However, the discounted version of the Big
Match has the orderfield property.
We now look at mixtures of classes of stochastic games. Each class,
C, defined above has some structure and we shall say a state s0 ∈ S has
property C, or simply s0 ∈ C if the structure of C holds (locally) in s0. For
example, s0 is a one player control state if q(s
′|s0, i, j) = q(s′|s0, i) for all
s′ ∈ S, i ∈ A, j ∈ B. Here, s0 is controlled by player 1. Note that the whole
game may not be a one player control game. We can extend this notion from
states to sets of states as well.
Definition 2.12. Mixture Class / Game: A stochastic game Γ with set
of states S is a mixture of classes C1 and C2 if S = S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅)
such that S1 ∈ C1 and S2 ∈ C2.
For example, Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r, q, β) is a mixture of a SER-SIT and a
one player control game if S = S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅) such that
r(s, i, j) = c(s) + a(i, j) for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s ∈ S1,
q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|i, j) for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s ∈ S1, s′ ∈ S,
and q(s′|s, i, j) = q(s′|s, i) for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, s ∈ S2, s′ ∈ S.
Mixtures of some classes of stochastic games have been shown to have
the orderfield property as well. For example, Sinha (1989) shows that a
mixture of SC and ARAT Games (denoted SC/ARAT) has the orderfield
property. On the other hand, it is also known that given classes of stochastic
games having the orderfield property, mixtures of these classes may not have
the orderfield property. For example, Sinha (1989) discusses the following
example where a mixture of two (zero-sum) SER-SIT games does not possess
the orderfield property.
Example 2.1. Mixture of two SER-SIT Games that does not have the
Orderfield Property:
Consider the following zero-sum β-discounted stochastic game with 4
states s1, s2, s3, s4 and the payoffs and transitions as given below:
s1 :


0
(1, 0, 0, 0)
0
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
0
(1, 0, 0, 0)
0
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)

 , s2 :


−1
(1, 0, 0, 0)
−1
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
−1
(1, 0, 0, 0)
−1
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)

 ,
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s3 :


−1
(1, 0, 0, 0)
−1
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
0
(1, 0, 0, 0)
0
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)

 , s4 :


0
(1, 0, 0, 0)
0
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
1
(1, 0, 0, 0)
1
(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)

 .
Here, we represent the (i, j)th entry in the matrix corresponding to state sk
as follows:[
r(sk, i, j)
(q(s1|sk, i, j), q(s2|sk, i, j), q(s3|sk, i, j), q(s4|sk, i, j))
]
.
Note that states s1 and s2 are SER-SIT, and states s3 and s4 are SER-
SIT, but the mixture is not SER-SIT as it violates the Separable Reward
property.
Let β = 34 . The value of the above stochastic game starting at state s1
is vβ(1) = −4 +
√
13.
3 Sufficient conditions for the orderfield property of mixture
classes
Given different classes of stochastic games, we look at the transitions
among states in these classes to define cycles and classes that are cycle-
free. We also define a sink class and use these concepts to derive sufficient
conditions for the orderfield property of mixtures of stochastic game classes.
Definition 3.1. Cycle, Length of a cycle: Given a stochastic game Γ
with set of states S and a partition of S into S1 and S2 (that is, S = S1∪S2,
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅), we say S1 and S2 are in a cycle if there exist pairs of states
(s1, s2) ∈ S1×S2 and (s′1, s′2) ∈ S1×S2, and pairs of actions (i, j) ∈ A1×A2
and (i′, j′) ∈ A1 ×A2 such that
q(s2|s1, i, j) > 0 and q(s′1|s′2, i′, j′) > 0.
We can also extend this definition to a partition of S into more than two
subsets where we can talk of cycles between pairs of subsets as well as cycles
involving more than two subsets.
Cycles between pairs of subsets are cycles of length 2. Absorbing classes
correspond to self-loops or cycles of length 1. Following is an example of a
cycle of length 3.
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S1
S2
S3
Definition 3.2. Cycle-free classes, Sink and Sub-game restricted to a
subset of states: Given a stochastic game Γ with set of states S = S1 ∪ S2,
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, we say S1 and S2 are cycle-free if they are not in a cycle. That
is,
either q(s1|s2, i, j) = 0,∀s1 ∈ S1,∀s2 ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2,
or q(s2|s1, i, j) = 0,∀s1 ∈ S1,∀s2 ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
We can extend this definition to a partition of S into more than two subsets
as well. If S = S1 ∪S2 ∪ . . .∪Sk, (Sk1 ∩Sk2 = ∅ for k1 6= k2), S1, S2, . . . , Sk
are cycle-free if there exists no cycle of any length l ≥ 2 among them.
If S1, S2, . . . , Sk are cycle-free, at least one of them is an absorbing subset
with no transitions going out of the subset. We call an absorbing subset a
sink. Without loss of generality, we may order the subsets such that there
are no transitions from Sk2 to Sk1 whenever k2 > k1. It follows that Sk is
a sink. That is,
∑
s′
k
∈Sk q(s
′
k|sk, i, j) = 1,∀sk ∈ Sk,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2. Once
the game reaches states in Sk, the game remains in Sk. In particular, if the
starting state s0 ∈ Sk, the whole game is within Sk. We can, hence, talk of
the sub-game restricted to Sk, which is an independent stochastic game. We
denote this by Γ|Sk.
There may be two or more sinks as well. In the following example,
S1, S2, S3 and S4 are cycle-free and S3 and S4 are sinks.
S1
S2
S3
S4
When k = 2, S1 and S2 are cycle free implies either S1 is a sink or S2 is
a sink. If we order the subsets as done above, then S2 is a sink.
3.1 Mixtures of 2-player β-discounted stochastic games. We state and
prove the following sufficient condition for mixtures of 2-player zero-sum β-
discounted stochastic games to possess the orderfield property. We prove
the theorem when a subset S1 of the set of states S is one player control. A
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similar proof works when S1 is perfect-information, SC, ARAT or a mixture
of SC and ARAT states (SC/ARAT). Note that SC/ARAT encompasses all
the other classes we have mentioned and has the orderfield property (Sinha,
1989).
Theorem 3.1. Let Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r, q, β) be a finite zero sum β-dis-
counted stochastic game where S = S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅). Assume the
following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r, q and β are rational.
(ii)
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|s, i, j) = 1 for all s ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2. In other words,
S2 is a sink. The independent sub-game restricted to the states S2,
Γβ|S2, has the orderfield property.
(iii) S1 belongs to {One Player Control, Perfect Information, SC, ARAT,
SC/ARAT}.
Then the mixed stochastic game Γβ has the orderfield property.
Proof. We prove the theorem when S1 is one player control. Without
loss of generality, let S1 be controlled by player 1, that is, q(s|s1, i, j) =
q(s|s1, i), for all s1 ∈ S1, s ∈ S, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
Define a new game Γ′β = (S
′ = S ∪ {s∗}, A1, A2, r′, q′, β) where s∗ is a
new absorbing state such that
r′(s∗, i, j) = 0,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
r′(s, i, j) = r(s, i, j) + β
∑
s2∈S2
q(s2|s, i)vβ(s2),∀s ∈ S1,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
(3.1)
r′(s, i, j) = r(s, i, j),∀s ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
q′(s∗|s, i) = 1−
∑
s1∈S1
q(s1|s, i),∀s ∈ S1,∀i ∈ A1.
q′(s1|s, i) = q(s1|s, i),∀s ∈ S1,∀s1 ∈ S1,∀i ∈ A1.
q′(s2|s, i) = 0,∀s ∈ S1,∀s2 ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1.
q′(s2|s, i, j) = q(s2|s, i, j),∀s ∈ S2,∀s2 ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
q′(s∗|s∗, i, j) = 1,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
It is easy to see that the sub-game restricted to S2 is the same indepen-
dent stochastic game in both Γβ and Γ
′
β. Therefore, for all s2 ∈ S2, optimal
values and optimal strategies in Γβ are precisely those in Γ
′
β .
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Now, for all s ∈ S1, Shapley equations for Γ′β are
v′β(s) = val(r
′(s, i, j) + β
∑
s1∈S1
q(s1|s, i)v′β(s1))
and Shapley equations for the game Γβ are
vβ(s) = val(r(s, i, j) + β
∑
s′∈S
q(s′|s, i)vβ(s′)).
Since r′(s, i, j) = r(s, i, j) + β
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|s, i)vβ(s2) (from (3.1)), the
auxiliary games above for Γβ and Γ
′
β coincide. Hence, optimal value and
optimal strategies are the same in both the games.
Further, note that the sub-game of Γ′β restricted to S1 ∪ {s∗} is an in-
dependent one player control game and hence, has the orderfield property.
(Since the inputs r′ and q′ are rationals. The fact that r′ is rational follows
as r is rational and as vβ(s2) is rational for all s2 ∈ S2).
Hence, given rational payoffs, transition probabilities and β, there exists
rational optimal value and optimal strategies in S1 as well as in S2 in both
the games (Γβ and Γ
′
β), proving the theorem for the one player control case.
Similarly, we can prove the existence of orderfield property in the mixture
Γβ when S1 is perfect information, SC, ARAT or an SC/ARAT mixture. In
particular, when S1 is ARAT, note that we can construct a new game Γ
′
β
where the rewards and transition probabilities are both additive. 2
In fact, S2 can be any finite zero sum β-discounted stochastic game with
the orderfield property. For example, it can be the discounted Big Match
which does not belong to any known class.
The following example contains cycles between two classes and has the
orderfield property. This shows that cycle-free mixtures are not necessary
for the orderfield property to hold.
Example 3.1. Mixture of SER-SIT and one player control states, with
cycles, but having the orderfield property:
s1 :


3
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )
0
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )
0
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )
1
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )

 , s2 :


2
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)
−1
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )
−1
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)
0
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 )

 , s3 :
[
0
(1, 0, 0)
]
.
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This game is a mixture of a set SER-SIT states S1 = {s1, s2} and a set
consisting of a one player control state S2 = {s3}. Clearly, this game has
cycles between S1 and S2. We shall show that this game has the orderfield
property.
Using Shapley’s theorem, value of the above stochastic game starting at
state s1 is
v1 = val

3 + β(v14 + v24 + v32 ) β(v14 + v24 + v32 )
β(v14 +
v2
4 +
v3
2 ) 1 + β(
v1
4 +
v2
4 +
v3
2 )

 ,
where we have written vs in place of vβ(s) for the sake of brevity.
Here, v2 = v1 − 1 and v3 = βv1.
It is easy to see that the auxiliary game corresponding to s1 does not
have a pure optimal strategy pair. Therefore, using Kaplansky’s theorem
(1945) we get v1 = (3− β)/[2(2 + β)(1− β)] which is rational whenever β is
rational. (14 ,
3
4), (
1
4 ,
3
4 ) constitute a pair of optimal strategies for the players
in states s1 and s2.
In the above Theorem 3.1, S2 can be SER-SIT. If S1 is SER-SIT with the
other conditions of the theorem remaining the same, the orderfield property
may not hold. We provide a counter example in the next section. Further,
for mixtures with SER-SIT to possess the orderfield property, we provide
a sufficient condition by placing an additional restriction on the transition
probabilities. When we mix two SER-SIT games, given this additional re-
striction on the transitions, we show that we do not require the classes to
be cycle-free.
We now extend Theorem 3.1 to a mixture of more than 2 classes and the
proof involves inductively applying Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. Let Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r, q, β) be a finite zero-sum β-dis-
counted stochastic game, where S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sk (Sk1 ∩ Sk2 = ∅ for
k1 6= k2). Assume the following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r, q and β are rational.
(ii) S1, S2, . . . , Sk are cycle-free. That is, for all k1, k2 (1 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ k),
q(sk1 |sk2 , i, j) = 0 for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, sk1 ∈ Sk1 , sk2 ∈ Sk2 .
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(iii) For each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, either Sl is an SC/ARAT mixture or Sl is a
sink such that Γβ|Sl has the orderfield property.
Then the mixed stochastic game Γβ has the orderfield property.
We now prove the following sufficient condition for mixtures of 2-player
non-zero-sum β-discounted stochastic games to possess the orderfield prop-
erty.
Theorem 3.3. Let Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r1, r2, q, β) where the set of states S
is partitioned into S1 and S2, (that is, S= S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅)), be
a finite, 2-person, non-zero sum stochastic game with β-discounted payoffs.
Assume the following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r1, r2, q and β are rational.
(ii)
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|s, i, j) = 1, ∀ s ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2. That is, S2 is a sink.
(iii) The sub-game restricted to S2, Γβ|S2 has a pair of equilibrium strate-
gies, (f∗, g∗), whose coordinates are rational.
(iv) S1 ∈ {One Player Control, Perfect Information, SC, ARAT}.
Then the mixed stochastic game Γβ has the orderfield property.
Proof. We shall prove the theorem when S1 is one player control.
Without loss of generality, let player 1 be the controlling player, that is,
q(s1|s, i, j) = q(s1|s, i) for all s ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
We are given a pair of rational equilibrium strategies, (f∗, g∗), for Γβ|S2.
We shall show that the corresponding equilibrium payoffs in S2, given by
I
(1)
β (f
∗, g∗)(s) for player 1 and I(2)β (f
∗, g∗)(s) for player 2, are rational as
well, that is, for player 1, I
(1)
β (f
∗, g∗) : S2 → R (the set of reals). We will
show that I
(1)
β (f
∗, g∗)(s) ∈ Q (the set of rationals), for all s ∈ S2.
Note that the strategies f∗ and g∗ are restricted to S2. That is,
f∗ : S2 → PA1 , g∗ : S2 → PA2 .
Without loss of generality, let S1 = {1, 2, . . . , k} and S2 = {k + 1, k +
2, . . . , n}.
I
(1)
β (f
∗, g∗) = (I(1)β (f
∗, g∗)(k + 1), . . . , I(1)β (f
∗, g∗)(n))
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= (I − βQ(f∗, g∗))−1


r1(k + 1, f
∗(k + 1), g∗(k + 1))
r1(k + 2, f
∗(k + 2), g∗(k + 2))
...
r1(n, f
∗(n), g∗(n))

 ,
where
r1(l, f
∗(l), g∗(l)) =
∑
i,j
r1(l, i, j)f
∗
i (l)g
∗
j (l), k + 1 ≤ l ≤ n
and Q(f∗, g∗) is the N × N matrix of transitions among states, when the
players play (f∗, g∗). (s, s′)th element of Q(f∗, g∗) is
q(s′|s, f∗(s), g∗(s)) =
∑
i,j
f∗i (s)q(s
′|s, i, j)g∗j (s).
As f∗i (s), q(s
′|s, i, j) and g∗j (s) are rational for all s ∈ S2, s′ ∈ S, i ∈
A1, j ∈ A2, Q(f∗, g∗) is rational too. Thus, I − βQ is rational. Further,
it is easy to show that I − βQ is invertible. Thus, I(1)β (f∗, g∗) is rational.
Similarly, I
(2)
β (f
∗, g∗) is rational too.
[Note that, unlike the zero-sum case where the optimal value is unique,
the non-zero-sum case may have different equilibrium payoffs corresponding
to different equilibrium strategies. We have shown that whenever we have
a pair of rational equilibrium strategies, the “corresponding” payoffs are
rational as well.]
Now, as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 for the zero-sum case, define a
new game Γ′ = (S′ = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {s∗}, A1, A2, r′1, r′2, q′, β) where s∗ is a new
absorbing state with immediate rewards that are 0 for both players no matter
what they play.
In the non-zero-sum case as well, it suffices to define r′1 in terms of I
(1)
β
and keep r′2 unchanged (as player 1 is the controlling player). That is
r′1(s, i, j) = r1(s, i, j)
+ β
∑
s2∈S2
q(s2|s, i)I(1)β (f∗, g∗)(s2),∀s ∈ S1,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
r′1(s, i, j) = r1(s, i, j),∀s ∈ S2,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
r′2(s, i, j) = r2(s, i, j),∀s ∈ S,∀i ∈ A1,∀j ∈ A2.
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The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 for the zero-sum
case. 2
We can inductively extend this theorem in the non-zero-sum case to
mixtures of more than 2 classes of stochastic games too.
3.2 Two-person undiscounted stochastic games. For the undiscounted
zero-sum case, we just state the following theorem and skip the proof.
Theorem 3.4. Let Γ = (S, A1, A2, r, q) where S = S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩
S2 = ∅), be a finite, zero sum stochastic game with undiscounted payoffs.
Assume the following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γ are rational. That is, r and q are rational.
(ii)
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|s, i, j) = 1 , ∀s ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
(iii) For all β rational, vβ(s) is rational, ∀s ∈ S2.
(iv) The undiscounted sub-game restricted to S2, Γ|S2, has the orderfield
property, that is, ∃ a pair of rational optimal strategies (f∗, g∗) and
v(s) = limβ↑1(1− β)vβ(s) ∈ Q,∀s ∈ S2. (Bewley and Kohlberg, 1976)
(v) S1 is an SC/ARAT mixture.
Then the undiscounted stochastic game, Γ, has the orderfield property.
We can write down a similar sufficient condition for the undiscounted
non-zero-sum case too and in all the above cases, we can extend to mixtures
of more than 2 classes as well.
4 SER-SIT mixtures
For mixtures with SER-SIT games, the conditions in the above theorems
are not sufficient for the mixture to have the orderfield property. While the
sinks can be SER-SIT, if non-sinks are SER-SIT, the orderfield property may
breakdown. We provide a counter example below.
Example 4.1. Cycle-free mixture of a SER-SIT Game and an indepen-
dent perfect information stochastic game, that does not have the Orderfield
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Property:
s1 :


3
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)
0
(12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4)
0
(14 ,
1
2 ,
1
4)
1
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)

 , s2 :


3
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)
0
(12 ,
1
4 ,
1
4)
0
(14 ,
1
2 ,
1
4)
1
(14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2)

 , s3 :
[
0
(0, 0, 1)
]
.
This game is a mixture of a set of SER-SIT states S1 = {s1, s2} and a set
consisting of perfect information state S2 = {s3}. It is easy to see that S1
and S2 are cycle-free, and S2 is a sink.
Let β = 12 . Then v1 = v2 =
96−8√111
11 .
Now, we provide a sufficient condition for cycle-free mixtures with non-
sink SER-SIT states to possess the orderfield property. We state and prove
the following theorem for the zero-sum discounted case. This sufficient con-
dition can be proved for the non-zero-sum case and the undiscounted case
as well.
Theorem 4.1. Let Γβ = (S,A1, A2, r, q, β) where the set of states S is
partitioned into S1 and S2, (that is, S= S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅)), be a finite
2-person zero sum stochastic game with β-discounted payoffs. Assume the
following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r, q and β are rational.
(ii)
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|s, i, j) = 1 for all s ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2. In other words,
S2 is a sink. The independent sub-game restricted to the states S2,
Γβ|S2, has the orderfield property.
(iii) All states in S1 are SER-SIT, that is, r(s1, i, j) = c(s1) + a(i, j) for
all s1 ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 and q(s|s1, i, j) = q(s|i, j) for all s ∈ S,
s1 ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
(iv) For all s ∈ S1,
∑
s1∈S1 q(s1|i, j) = q0 for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 where
q0 ∈ [0, 1] is a constant.
Then the mixed stochastic game Γβ has the orderfield property.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let S1 = {1, 2, ..., k} and S2 = {k +
1, k + 2, ..., N}. By Shapley’s theorem, the value of the stochastic game
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starting at state 1 is as follows:
v1 = val


r11 r12 . . . r1m2
r21 r22 . . . r2m2
...
...
...
rm11 rm12 . . . rm1m2

 ,
where
rij = r(1, i, j) + β
∑
s∈S
q(s|i, j)vs. (4.1)
(As state 1 ∈ S1 is SER-SIT) that is,
rij = r(1, i, j) + β
∑
s′∈S1
q(s′|i, j)vs′ + β
∑
s′′∈S2
q(s′′|i, j)vs′′ .
As S1 is SER-SIT, we can write vs1 = v1 + cs1 for all s1 ∈ S1 where
cs1 = c(s1)− c(1). Therefore,
rij = r(1, i, j) + β
∑
s′∈S1
q(s′|i, j)(v1 + cs′) + β
∑
s′′∈S2
q(s′′|i, j)vs′′ = mij + w,
where
mij = r(1, i, j) + β
∑
s′∈S1
q(s′|i, j)cs′ + β
∑
s′′∈S2
q(s′′|i, j)vs′′
and w = βv1
∑
s′∈S1 q(s
′|i, j). Due to assumption (iv),
w = βv1q0, (4.2)
which is independent of the choice of actions of the players.
For all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2, mij is rational. (As r, q and β are rational.
Moreover, vs′′ is rational as the sub-game restricted to S2 has the orderfield
property). Therefore (4.1) becomes
v1 = val(M) + w, (4.3)
where M = [mij]1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2 . M is a matrix game with rational en-
tries and hence has the orderfield property. The coefficient of v1 in (4.2)
is rational. Hence (4.3) is a linear equation in v1 with rational coefficients.
Thus, v1 is rational. It follows that vs1 is rational for all s1 ∈ S1. (Since
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vs1 = v1+cs1). Optimal strategies of the players in M are optimal strategies
in the stochastic game as well, for all initial states s1 ∈ S1. 2
The following example contains non-sink SER-SIT states but the total
transitions out of each of these SER-SIT states is a constant across action
pairs (assumption (iv) in the above theorem).
Example 4.2. Non-sink SER-SIT states mixed with one player control
states, and having the orderfield property:
s1 :


1(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
) 0(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0
)
0(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0
) 1(
0, 12 , 0,
1
2
)

 , s2 :


2(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
) 1(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0
)
1(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 , 0
) 2(
0, 12 , 0,
1
2
)

 ,
s3 :


1
(0, 0, 1, 0)
0
(0, 0, 1, 0)
0
(0, 0, 0, 1)
1
(0, 0, 0, 1)

 , s4 :
[
1
(0, 0, 0, 1)
]
Let β be a rational discount factor.
This game is a mixture of a set of SER-SIT states S1 = {s1, s2} and a set
of one player control states S2 = {s3, s4}. Though the SER-SIT class S1 is
not a sink, this game has the orderfield property. Note that the sum of the
transition probabilities from s1 to s3 and s4 is always
1
2 , independent of the
actions of the players. Similarly for s2. S2 constitutes an independent one
player control game whose value vector is (v3 =
1
(1−β)(2−β) , v4 =
1
1−β ) and
optimal strategies are (12 ,
1
2) and (
1
2−β ,
1−β
2−β ) for players 1 and 2 respectively
in state 3. (In state 4, both players have just 1 action). Now v2 can be
written in terms of v1. Here, v2 = v1 + 1.
The above facts enable us to “separate out” the variables v1 and v2 from
the auxiliary matrix games for states s1 and s2 as described below. Value of
the stochastic game starting at state s1 is v1 = val(M) + w, where
M =

1 + β4 (v3 + v4) β4 + βv32
β
4 +
βv3
2 1 +
β
2 +
βv4
2


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and w = βv12 . M is a matrix game with rational entries as v3 and v4 are
rational. Therefore, val(M) is rational, giving v1 and v2 are rational. Further
the matrix game M has a pair of rational optimal strategies which are also
optimal strategies in s1 and s2 for both the players.
In the following example, we consider two sets of SER-SIT states such
that the mixture has the orderfield property, though there are cycles between
the two sets. This example illustrates a sufficient condition for a mixture of
two SER-SIT classes to possess the orderfield property, which we formally
state and prove in Theorem 4.2 (after the example).
Example 4.3. Mixture of two SER-SIT Games that has the Orderfield
Property: Consider the following zero-sum stochastic game with 4 states
s1, s2, s3, s4 and the payoffs and transitions as given below:
s1 :


0(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
) 0(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
0(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
) 0(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
)

 , s2 :


−1(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
) −1(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
−1(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
) −1(
1
2 , 0,
1
4 ,
1
4
)

 ,
s3 :


−1(
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
1
3 ,
1
4
) −1(
1
4 ,
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
1
3
)
0(
1
4 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 ,
1
12
) 0(
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
5
12 ,
1
6
)

 , s4 :


0(
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
1
3 ,
1
4
) 0(
1
4 ,
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
1
3
)
1(
1
4 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 ,
1
12
) 1(
1
6 ,
1
4 ,
5
12 ,
1
6
)

 .
Here, states 1 and 2 are SER-SIT, and states 3 and 4 are SER-SIT, but the
mixture is not SER-SIT.
v1 = val(M1) + w1 where w1 =
β
2v1 +
β
2 v3 and M1 =
[
β
4
0
0 β
4
]
.
val(M1) =
β
8 and the strategy (
1
2 ,
1
2) is optimal for both players.
v3 = val(M2) + w2 where w2 =
5
12βv1 +
7
12βv3 and M2 =
[
−1 −1+β
6
− β
12
− β
12
]
.
val(M2) = − β12 and (2nd row, 1stcolumn) is a pair of optimal strategies.
We get the following linear equations with rational coefficients, solving
which we obtain v1 and v3:
v1 =
β
8
+
β
2
v1 +
β
2
v3,
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v3 = − β
12
+
5
12
βv1 +
7
12
v3.
Now, we state and prove the following sufficient condition for a mixture of
two SER-SIT sets to possess the orderfield property. In this case, there may
be cycles between S1 and S2 and the mixture has the orderfield property as
long the total transitions going out of S1 and those out of S2 are constants.
Theorem 4.2. Let Γβ = (S, A1, A2, r, q, β) where the set of states S
is partitioned into S1 and S2, (that is, S= S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅)), be a
finite 2-person zero sum stochastic game with β-discounted payoffs. Assume
the following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r, q and β are rational.
(ii) All states in S1 are SER-SIT, that is, r(s1, i, j) = c(s1) + a(i, j) for
all s1 ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 and q(s|s1, i, j) = q(s|i, j) for all s ∈ S,
s1 ∈ S1, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
(iii) For all s ∈ S1,
∑
s1∈S1 q(s1|i, j) = q0 for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 where
q0 ∈ [0, 1] is a constant.
(iv) All states in S2 are SER-SIT, that is, r(s2, i, j) = c
′(s2) + a′(i, j) for
all s2 ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 and q(s|s2, i, j) = q(s|i, j) for all s ∈ S,
s2 ∈ S2, i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2.
(v) For all s ∈ S2,
∑
s2∈S2 q(s2|i, j) = q0′ for all i ∈ A1, j ∈ A2 where
q0
′ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant.
Then the mixed stochastic game Γβ has the orderfield property.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let S1 = {1, 2, ..., k} and S2 = {k +
1, k + 2, ..., N}. The value of the stochastic game starting at state 1 is
v1 = val
[
r(1, i, j) + β
∑
s∈S q(s|i, j)vs
]
1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2 .
Here S1 and S2 are both SER-SIT. Hence we can write vs1 = v1+ cs1 for all
s1 ∈ S1 where cs1 = c(s1)− c(1), and vs2 = vk+1 + c′s2 for all s2 ∈ S2 where
c′s2 = c
′(s2)− c′(k + 1).
In lines similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1,
v1 = val(M) + w, (4.4)
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where w = βv1q0 + βvk+1(1− q0)
M =

r(1, i, j) + β ∑
s1∈S1
q(s1|i, j)cs1 + β
∑
s2∈S2
q(s2|i, j)c′s2


1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2
and w is linear in v1 and vk+1 with rational coefficients and is independent of
the choice of actions of the players. Note that M is free of variables and all
entries are rational. Hence val(M) is rational and there exists rational opti-
mal strategies which are optimal strategies for all s1 ∈ S1 in the stochastic
game as well.
Now, the value of the stochastic game starting at state k + 1 is
vk+1 = val(M
′) + w′, (4.5)
where w′ = βv1(1− q0′) + βvk+1q0′ and M ′ is given by
r(k + 1, i, j) + β ∑
s1∈S1
q(s1|i, j)cs1 + β
∑
s2∈S2
q(s2|i, j)c′s2


1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2
.
There exists rational optimal strategies for all s2 ∈ S2 as well, since M ′ is a
matrix game with rational entries.
Now, equations (4.4) and (4.5) constitute a system of linear equations in
v1 and vk+1 with rational coefficients. It follows that vs is rational for all
s ∈ S. 2
We can extend the above sufficient conditions for mixtures with SER-SIT
states to the discounted non-zero-sum case, undiscounted zero-sum case and
to the undiscounted non-zero-sum case as well. Similar to Theorem 3.2, we
have sufficient conditions for mixtures with SER-SIT states and involving
more than two sets of states.
5 Orderfield property of mixtures of 2-player games with
(multi-player) polystochastic games
Janovskaya (1968) introduced polymatrix games and Howson (1972) gave
an algorithm by formulating these games as an LCP. Polystochastic games
were introduced by Mohan, Neogy and Parthasarathy (1997) as a generaliza-
tion of polymatrix games. They showed that one player control polystochas-
tic games have the orderfield property by formulating them as an LCP that
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can be processed by Lemke’s algorithm (1965). In this section, we look at
mixtures of 2-player games with polystochastic games.
Definition 5.1. A non-zero-sum, polystochastic game is a multi-player
stochastic game defined as follows.
1. There are n players, n is finite.
2. S = {1, 2, . . . , N} is a non-empty, finite set of states.
3. Ak = {1, 2, . . . ,mk} is the set of actions for player k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
4. At each state s, each pair of players, (k1, k2), has associated partial
rewards, rk1k2(s, i, j). These partial rewards depend only on the actions
i and j of players k1 and k2 and are independent of the actions chosen
by the other players. Total immediate reward of player k1 in state
s rk1(s, i, j) =
∑
k2 6=k1(rk1k2(s, i, jk2)) where i = i(k1) is the action
chosen by player k1 in state s and j = (jk2) is the vector of actions
chosen by all other players k2. Let Rk1k2(s) be the corresponding matrix
of partial immediate rewards to player k1 depending on actions of k2.
5. Transition probabilities q(s′|s, i1, i2, ..., in) are the probabilities of tran-
sition from state s to state s′ when the players respectively choose
actions i1, i2, ..., in.
We can extend the definitions of different types of strategies and defini-
tions of classes of stochastic games to polystochastic games as well.
Now, we look at mixtures of one player control polystochastic states with
2-player states of known classes. We state the following theorem for 3-player
polystochastic games and this can be extended to the general n-player case
as well.
Theorem 5.1. Let Γβ = (S,A1, A2, A3, r1, r2, r3, q, β) be a finite, 3-per-
son, non-zero sum stochastic game with β-discounted payoffs, where S =
S1 ∪ S2, (S1 ∩ S2 = ∅). Assume the following conditions:
(i) The inputs to Γβ are rational. That is, r1, r2, r3, q and β are rational.
(ii) S2 is a sink. Furthermore, Γβ|S2 is a one player control polystochastic
game.
(iii) States in S1 involve only two players, say player 1 and player 2. Fur-
ther, S1 ∈ {One Player Control, Perfect Information, SC, ARAT}.
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Then the mixed stochastic game S has the orderfield property.
The proof is similar to the proof of the 2-player discounted non-zero sum
case. A similar theorem holds for the undiscounted case as well. When S1 is
SER-SIT, we have sufficient conditions similar to that for the 2-player case.
6 Conclusion and future work
We extend known classes of stochastic games with the orderfield property
to mixtures of some of these classes. In the 2-player case, if the set of states S
can be partitioned into cycle-free subsets S1, S2, . . . Sk where each Sl has the
orderfield property and any non-sink Sh is either one player control or perfect
information or switching control or ARAT or SC/ARAT (in the zero-sum
case), then the mixture has the orderfield property. If there are non-sink sets
Sh of SER-SIT states, then we additionally require the sum of the transition
probabilities going out of Sh to be a constant, for each such Sh. If all these
sets are SER-SIT, we can drop the cycle-free requirement. We extend these
theorems to multi-player stochastic games by allowing sinks to be one player
control polystochastic games.
We believe that cycle-free mixtures of different one player control poly-
stochastic games have the orderfield property. In other words, switching
control polystochastic games where there are no cycles between states of
both players, have the orderfield property. We can also extend multi-player
mixtures to mixtures of 2-player switching control or ARAT games with
multi-player perfect information or ARAT games. Further, we can also mix
different multi-player perfect information or ARAT classes among themselves
or with one player control polystochastic games such that the polystochastic
games are sinks.
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